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Super Selectos: Winning the war against multinational retail chains. 
 
Abstract  
 
This case describes how Super Selectos, a local food retail chain from El Salvador, has 
succeeded in competing against Walmart, the number one food retailer in the world. The case 
has been structured to facilitate a discussion of competitive strategy and positioning in the 
food retail industry in emerging markets. It provides enough information for the reader to 
understand the differentiation strategy that allowed Super Selectos not only maintain but to 
increase its market share after Walmart entered its domestic market.  The goal of the case is 
to illustrate how a well formulated and executed strategy allows outcompete even the most 
resourceful rivals, providing insights into the development of the food retail industry and 
consumer segmentation in developing economies. The case provides the basis for discussing 
the strategic options that Walmart has in the Salvadorian market and illustrating the 
challenges that large multinational corporations face when they entering new emerging 
markets.  
 
Key words: food retail, business strategy, emerging economies, domestic companies, MNCs 
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Super Selectos: winning the war against multinational retail chains. 
 
The morning of March 3, 2011, after listening to a radio announcement promoting the 
Super Selectos stores, Carlos Calleja, Vice-president of this Salvadorian supermarket chain, 
met with his management team to discuss a latent threat: Walmart. Walmart Central America, 
a division of the world’s largest retailer, had just announced plans to implement its global 
strategy in the region: to brand its stores as Walmart and offer everyday low prices to its 
clients. By then Walmart was the dominant player in each country of Central America with 
the exception of El Salvador. It was only a question of time before the largest company in the 
world leveraged its expertise to capture the Salvadorian market. Despite the fact that Super 
Selectos owned 84 retail stores, 51% of the market and close to US $600 million in annual 
income, continuing as El Salvador’s number one supermarket would be a very though 
challenge. After analyzing the situation, Carlos and his team asked themselves what measures 
they should take to continue winning the battle in the local market, as they had done up until 
that point. 
 
Economic, Political and Social Situation 
 
In the year 2010  the Central American region grew by 4.4% with Guatemala, Honduras, 
El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panamá experiencing growth rates of respectively 
2.9%, 3.7%, 1.4%, 3.6%, 4.7% and 7.5%. (See Table 1) (IMF, World Economic Outlook 
2011). 
TABLE 1 HERE 
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El Salvador was the fourth largest economy in the Central America (CA) and Panamá 
region, after Guatemala, Costa Rica and Panama.  In 2010 its GDP reached US $21.2 billion, 
approximately US $3,400 per inhabitant. According to the Central Bank, one of the country’s 
main sources of income was family remittances from the US that reached US$3.5 billion in 
2010, a 2.2% growth over 2009. 
Latin America’s average inflation rate in 2010 was 6.5%. Most countries faced increased 
inflation from 2009 due in large part to an increase in food and beverage prices. El Salvador’s 
inflation equaled 2.1%, one of the lowest rates in the region. However, consumers had to deal 
with an almost 7.9% increase in the price of food (corn and beans) and a 3.4% increase in the 
cost of transportation, due to higher international fuel prices (Ramírez, 2011). 
Improvements in the country’s economic and social areas were backed by an anti-crisis 
plan proposed by President Mauricio Funes in 2009, who announced the creation of 100,000 
jobs by 2011 and in 2010 proposed a law to increase public employee lowest salaries and 
pensions 45% and 44% and the rest 6% and 8% respectively. In addition, he established the 
National Consumer Protection Policy to be enacted by the National Consumer Protection 
System, which, among other objectives, enforced warranties for purchased products and the 
right to be reimbursed in cash when a product was defective.  
 
Retail Industry 
 
Since the 90s retail business began to experience rapid change. One such change was an 
increase in the size of commercial establishments, which allowed businesses to offer a greater 
variety of products in larger volumes (Dobson & Waterson, 1997).  The adoption of 
information technology in logistics and operations management allowed retailers to lower 
their costs and become more efficient, for example by optimizing inventory management. 
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Walmart was at the forefront of these innovations, which allowed retailers to be profitable in 
spite of lowering their average selling prices (Holmes, 2001, Foster, Haltiwanger, & Krizan, 
2002).   
New layouts, such as hypermarkets became popular as they offered food and traditional 
products, and other categories, such as appliances, electronics, books, garden products, 
clothing, shoes, toys and decorations. These categories represented 35% of the floor space 
which usually totaled more than 2,500 m2 and included the traditional supermarkets.  
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Global retail industry sales were US$3.3 trillion by 2005 and US$4.3 trillion in 2009 with 
an annual growth rate of 6.9%.  The industry was characterized by its high concentration of 
players, since the largest 15 retailers accounted for 30% of sales (USDA, 2009).  
Globally in 2010, hypermarkets and supermarkets represented 46.4% of the market, 
followed by convenience stores with 30.7%; specialized food and beverage stores with 
15.1%; pharmacies and beauty stores with 1.7%; wholesale stores with membership clubs 
with 1.6%; other stores represented 4.5% (Datamonitor, 2010). In El Salvador, supermarkets, 
hypermarkets and convenience stores accounted for 38% of the market, neighborhood stores 
accounted for 60% and pharmacies 2% (ACNielsen, 2011).  Some consumers wanted to 
reduce the time spent shopping and their costs, being able to buy most items at the same time 
and place – known as “one-stop shopping”. See Table 2. However, other customers do not 
always see large supermarkets as the best place to shop, since they only needed some 
products and shopped quickly – known as “on-the-run”. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
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For customers, switching among supermarkets and other retail outlets does not entail 
costs. Hence, it is an industry characterized by high rivalry, where efficiency and customer 
service are important tools for competitiveness. 
Another characteristic of the industry is that the largest players have acquired dominant 
positions in different regions. Walmart is the dominant player in North, Central and Latin 
America while Carrefour and Tesco are, for example, stronger in Europe. 
 
Strategies of Global Retailers 
 
In the year 2010, the average revenue per customer per visit to a store in the US was 
US$26.80 therefore, volume was important to retailers. To attract consumers, retails deploy 
different strategies. Walmart, by far the dominant player in the US market, adopted a “low 
prices everyday” strategy (ELDP), positioning itself as the chain capable to offer prices that 
were lower than competitors on the vast majority of products, every day. EDLP retailers 
charge a constant low price every day and do not use promotions with temporary discounts 
creating price consistency and reducing customers’ uncertainty (Hoch, Drèze & Purk, 1994). 
Other retailers use a variety of commercial strategies, some offer promotions – known as Hi 
Low or Promo pricing which emphasizes deep and frequent discounts on a smaller set of 
goods during a determined period of time (Ellickson & Misra, 2008). The Hi Low strategy is 
characterized by average daily prices higher than those offered by firms deploying EDLP, 
coupled with frequent promotions which reduce temporarily the price of a limited range of 
product to the same or below that offered by EDLP retailers. Other retailers positioned 
themselves as niche players, for example Whole Foods, and others focused on providing 
superior consumer service. Most retailers strengthened their negotiating position by 
establishing their own brands know as private label (Datamonitor, 2010). 
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Suppliers 
 
 Large global retailers, such as Walmart and Carrefour, have today much more bargaining 
power with suppliers than the supermarket chains of the 1970s because they account for a 
large share of the total volume of food sales (Deloitte, 2011).  Suppliers had to adapt, 
improving their delivery times and accepting discounted prices, which translated into savings 
for the end consumer, and hence competitiveness for retailers. To avoid stocking problems 
retailers prefer establishing long term relationships with trusted suppliers. Small retailers, 
such as specialty or organic shops and neighborhood stores do not have the same negotiation 
advantage.  
 
Consumers 
 
Another trend that characterized the industry was the increasing sophistication of 
consumers: through the use of internet website, price comparator websites, and mobile 
devices, consumers have gained accessed to an increasing wealth of information about 
products, prices and the offerings of competing retail chains.  
El Salvador’s Consumer Protection Agency grouped consumers into three levels; “low-
income markets”, including 100 municipalities with extreme poverty rates of 40.2% and 
household incomes averaging US$201 dollars; “moderate-income markets”, including 146 
municipalities with extreme poverty rates of 19.4% and household incomes averaging 
US$308 dollars; and “high-income markets”, including 16 municipalities with extreme 
poverty rates of 7.6% and household income averaging US$534 dollars. The Agency found 
that in urban areas, 63.6% of the population bought fresh and processed food, while 35.7% 
only bought fresh food and a small proportion (0.7%) only bought processed food.  In rural 
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areas, around 55.4% of the population bought both types, while more bought only fresh 
(44.3%), and fewer bought only processed (0.4%).  See Table 3 and 4. 
 
TABLE 3 and 4 HERE 
 
Food Retailers in Central America 
 
CA’s retail market was worth $44 billion.  Informal neighborhood stores and municipal 
farmers markets represented between 40 and 50% of the total market (CBS News, 2011). 
Neighborhood stores are used mainly by low- and middle-income customers, who tend to 
buy on a daily or weekly base, prefer small packages, a personalized service and no-interest 
loans to be paid back on the payday and simply controlled by an informal notebook. 
Guatemala had approximately 100,000 neighborhood stores, with an average area of 3 m2 
and US$500 in inventory. El Salvador had 70,000 stores and only 14% managed inventory 
over US$500. Nicaragua had around 85,000 of these stores. “Farmer markets” or “city 
markets” in which farmers or local intermediaries offered fresh produce were also common. 
With locales measuring 3x3 meters, these markets opened seven days a week, or just on fair 
days and weekends. Honduras had 16 markets in Tegucigalpa and 17 in San Pedro Sula. San 
Salvador had seven markets and at least one in each town (USDA 2009, Salinas, 2008). 
In El Salvador the largest retail chain belonged to Grupo Calleja, which had 84 
supermarkets under two brands, Super Selectos and Selectos Market. It competed face-to-
face with Walmart, which owned 78 stores under the name Despensa Familiar (53) and 
Despensa de Don Juan (25), as well as two hypermarkets called Hiper Paiz. The third largest 
supermarket chain belonged to Saca Group and had four supermarkets and one hypermarket 
under the name Europa; Saca Group had 4% of the market. PriceSmart a membership club 
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had two stores and approximately 8% of the market. Finally, there were around 140 
convenience stores, mostly located at gas stations. 
Calleja Group 
Calleja S.A., which created Super Selectos supermarket brand, was founded in the year 
1963 by Daniel Calleja, a manager with previous experience in the Salvadorian retail 
industry.  
In 1969 Grupo Calleja revolutionized the market by opening the first large store in San 
Salvador, measuring 1,600 m². The success of that store led them to begin developing and 
expanding nationally, inaugurating supermarkets in the departments of Sonsonate, San 
Miguel and Santa Ana (Soriano, 2011). Between the 1970s and the 2000s, they grew through 
acquisitions, buying the local retail chains Todos supermarkets, El Sol, Multimart, La 
Tapachulteca and Todos por Menos. By the year 2000 they opened 13 new stores called De 
Todo with an average area of 600 m² per locale. These stores offered costumers living in 
municipalities far from the capital refrigerated and perishable products, such as meat, fruit 
and vegetables, dairy products, juices and other food products, as well as clothes, cosmetics, 
toys and some appliances. 
Francisco said: “The idea behind De Todo was to get closer to customers, especially those 
that had a hard time getting to larger cities to make purchases to satisfy their basic needs. The 
idea we had was for us to go to the customer, not make the customer come to us. Our mission 
is “to serve customers where they live” (Menjívar, 2011). The CEO of Selectos pointed to the 
strategic reasons for its success in the Salvadoran market, including being a flexible, and 
locally focused organization:  
“In order to implement the company’s strategy, we employed a day-to-day sales 
strategy, making tactical decisions quickly and at the right time after rapid analysis. 
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That had allowed us to retain a certain competitive advantage over our main 
competitors who many times had to wait for approval from their headquarters in 
order to make a decision and implement it.” 
By 2000 Grupo Calleja had 69 stores throughout most of the country, except Chalatenango 
and Morazan regions. With 44 Super Selectos, 13 La Tapa supermarkets, 12 De Todo 
supermarkets and more than 5,000 employees, they were positioned as the country’s leading 
supermarket chain. In 2003, Walmart’s made its intentions to enter the Salvadorian market 
very clear by showing its interest in buying the Group Calleja, this was the first challenging 
decision for Calleja´s management team: should they sell or compete with one of the largest 
and most resourceful companies in the world?  
They decide to compete with Walmart. They invested in new stores with better layouts, 
continuing their organic growth in the Salvadorian market (Barrera, 2004). In 2005, Walmart 
formally entered the Salvadorian market. Calleja Group knew that investing in infrastructure 
was not enough. They still had logistics problems, such as theft of merchandise at warehouses 
and stores, inappropriate inventory controls, launched sales that did not satisfy the needs of 
consumers and did not know which products were most demanded at each store. By 2006, 
they set up an Integrated Business Management System (IBMS), a Point of Sale (POS) 
Information System in order to obtain real time data on merchandise sold and a HR 
scheduling system with an investment of US$3 million dollars. With a total investment of US 
$9 million, they closed the year 2006 with 76 stores and over 55% of the market (Barrera, 
2006).  
In February 2009 they announced the opening of five new stores despite the fact they had 
experienced a 7% reduction in sales that month, with respect to the previous year. Carlos 
Calleja believed they had to continue investing, and he also said that part of their sales 
strategy was to reduce the price of 400 basic need products (El Diario de Hoy, 2009).  
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In 2010 the Group maintained their long time Hi-Low pricing strategy, offering a limited 
variety of products at much more competitive prices for a certain period of time representing 
savings for customers. “We did follow our pricing strategy during the economic crisis of 
2009, even though it meant a temporary drop in our profit margin. We’re a Salvadorian 
supermarket, so we had to respond to their needs,” stated Carlos Calleja. At that time they 
had 82 stores and had restructured spaces taking advantage of their specialization in 
supermarkets; they also decided to change the name of their stores to Super Selectos (67) and 
create a new space called Selectos Market (15) (El Diario de Hoy, 2010).  They differentiated 
the spaces based on the market served. Super Selectos was focused on urban populations: 
20% of their stores served upper and upper-middle classes (AB), 40% the middle-class (C), 
and the other 40% the middle and lower classes (CD). See Table 5. Selectos Market served 
smaller towns with low- to middle-income; prices were 5 to 7% lower than at Super Selectos. 
See Table 5. 
TABLE 5 HERE 
The selection at Super Selectos was much better (35,000 SKU) than Selectos Market 
(15,000 SKU) which offered only leading brands and the company’s own brand and did not 
have as much of a variety in perishable foods, such as fruits, vegetables and meats, among 
others. Super Selectos averaged 1,250 m², while Selectos Market averaged 600 m2. However, 
their personalized customer service was similar and both had air conditioning, provided 
grocery bags and following their long time Hi-Low pricing strategy but now advertising more 
than 800 promotions per month. See Figure 2A and 2B. These similarities made customers 
perceive both types of stores as “Selectos”. This perception had allowed the company to win 
over new customers quickly when they had entered in informal markets (in other words, 
where no other supermarkets already existed) and those that had been recently formalized by 
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the competition, especially in small cities. The Selectos brand was considered the number one 
supermarket by 63% of the population, while Despensa de Don Juan and Despensa Familiar 
reported only 17% and 13%, respectively. 
FIGURE 2A AND 2B HERE 
At the beginning of 2011 the company continued to offer competitive prices and a large 
number of promotions and sales and opened two more Super Selectos. They had a total of 84 
stores and close to 52% of the market. In general, their prices were slightly lower than 
Despensa de Don Juan, but Despensa Familiar was cheaper, offering prices 8 to 10% less 
than those of Selectos. Between 2004 and 2010 sales had grown 8% to reach US $551 
million. Most of this growth was a result of larger purchases by captive customers, new 
customers and an increase in the remittances business. They estimated that on average, 
Salvadorians spent US $120 per month. See Table 6. Their operational cash flow (EBITDA) 
over sales was above the 6% average for CA. The best companies in the region had an 
EBITDA to sales ratio between 8.5 and 10%. As a reference, the New York Stock 
Exchange’s EBITDA for US supermarkets, Whole Foods and Kroger, showed 8% and 3%, 
respectively. 
TABLE 6 HERE 
Selectos wanted to maintain and even increase its market presence, so the company 
decided to invest more than US $40 million in two large projects: the first was to build a 
center to manufacture food products and manage logistics for perishable products; and the 
second was to open 12 new stores (López, 2011). They set aside US$13 million to build an 
agro-industrial meat and poultry processing plant, fruit and vegetable packaging plant and 
bakery. They projected productivity would increase by 15% in meat processing, while in 
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baked goods, they would be able to bake for the entire chain with in-store bakeries. In 
addition, they would centralize 20 fruit and vegetable suppliers and 20 meat suppliers. Little 
by little, this would allow them to work with new suppliers, as long as they complied with the 
company’s quality standards and delivery conditions (López, 2011).   
This investment would allow them to strengthen their own brands, such as La Rioja cold 
meats, Dany (groceries), Brisa (toilet paper, paper towels and napkins) and Casablanca 
(cleaning products). These brands included more than 120 products that had represented 
between 3% and 4% of sales in 2010. Carlos Calleja stated: "Our brand plays an important 
role in the country’s economy, since we offer customers an excellent quality product at a 
competitive price” (Azucena, 2009). 
Selectos had followed this strategy in 2010 with producers from the northern part of the 
country. The company bought their products directly, substituting a large part of the US$24 
million that they imported in fruit and vegetables with 100% Salvadorian products. The 
company is therefore contributing with the development of the country (Choto, 2010). 
Ricardo Velasquez commented: “Different from other supermarket chains, we are concern of 
building a relationship that also benefits suppliers, even if that relationship temporarily 
affects our company’s profit margin.”  
 
 Organizational Structure 
 
In 2011 the company finished its organizational strengthening process that it had begun 
implementing five years earlier. This process consisted of restructuring personnel in central 
offices and at the supermarkets. 
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Francisco Calleja remained as President. He delegated the administrative and operational 
management to a Management Committee that was informally staffed by the Vice-president 
(Carlos Calleja), CEO (Herbert Tobar) and Deputy CEO (Ricardo Velasquez). These men 
were in charge of evaluating different decision-making issues and defining guidelines for 
implementation. The President authorized this Committee to approve and finalize 
investments and define the Group’s strategy. However, Francisco continued to be involved in 
the company. His vast experience was useful, providing advice to the Committee when he 
thought fit, especially when they were making large investments or major strategic decisions. 
A new organizational structure was defined. See Figure 3. 
 
FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
In addition to the Management Committee, they had also created an Executive Committee 
that included the Management Committee members plus the Sales, Purchasing, Financial and 
Systems Directors. This Committee held weekly meetings and analyzed each department’s 
work and performance. Despite the Committees and organizational restructuring, the 
company still lacked a formal Board of Directors; they had a board, but it operated 
informally.  
Walmart and Walmart Mexico and Central America 
Walmart was founded in 1962 in Rogers, Arkansas, by Sam Walton, who, under the 
philosophy of “buy it low, stack it high and sell it cheap,” started an adventure into the world 
of retail initially mostly in small towns.  
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Offering EDLP, the main strategy of Walmart, was not an easy task. It entailed improving 
its efficiency to ensure that its operational costs were consistently lower than competitors. 
This was achieved through substantial investments in logistics and information technology.  
By 2010 Walmart had 129 distribution centers each serving more than 75 stores. The IT 
system allowed the company to have real time information on sales, stock, deliveries by 
store, to manage the size and mix of the products by store based on specific customer 
characteristics and more. Information was shared with some suppliers to help them plan their 
deliveries. Walmart paid industry salaries plus an interesting profit sharing system and 
bonuses that make employees work the extra mile. 
In the 90s, Walmart began to move little-by-little up the supply chain and negotiate 
directly with manufacturers saving between 3-4% of the cost of the goods. It also expanded 
its private label business with third parties, getting involved in marketing and plant 
supervision roles. The price of Sam’s American Choice detergent was 50% lower than 
Procter and Gamble’s Tide. Walmart’s private label products represented around 40% of 
sales in the US and 10% in CA. 
Walmart was also a hard negotiator. In 2002 the company decided to start making direct 
purchase. Suppliers were limited to accept conditions and prices that Walmart offered. 
Different from other retailers, the price negotiated included additional costs for suppliers, 
such as commissions to manage returns, publicity and promotional expenses and the cost of 
merchandizing which runs from 5% to 15% of the value of the product, and included people 
to demonstrate the product and give samples in the stores, among other promotions. The 
company was always looking for new suppliers and became the largest importer of products 
from China in the 90s. 
Walmart’s internationalization began in 1991 when the company entered Mexico and 
opened a Sam´s Club in partnership with a domestic Mexican retailer, CIFRA, later acquired 
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by Walmart. In 1994 Walmart expanded to Canada and then the large emerging markets in 
South America and Asia. 
In 2005 Walmart acquired one-third of the Central American Retail Holding Company 
(CARHCO). CARHCO had been created as a commercial alliance among Grupo La Fragua 
(Guatemala), Royal Ahold (Holland) and Corporación Supermercados Unidos (Costa Rica) 
with one third each. CARHCO owned 254 stores in the five countries, of which 191 were 
discount stores, 55 were supermarkets, seven were hypermarkets and one was a membership 
store with an estimated regional market share of 60%. This alliance was expected to generate 
sales upward of US $3 billion throughout Central American (El Diario de Hoy, 2011). 
Eduardo Solorzano, President of the Board of Directors of Wal-Mart Mexico and Central 
America and General Manager of Wal-Mart Latin America said: 
"I am pleased to end this year with a historic operation. The acquisition of Wal-Mart Central 
America makes Wal-Mart Mexico an international company, with 1,929 stores operating in 
six countries, generating annual sales of more than US $25 billion. It also gives our 
shareholders additional opportunities for growth in five countries, in addition to the 
opportunities that exist here in our country.” 
 
TABLE 7 HERE 
 
In 2006 Walmart became the owner of 51 % of the alliance and changed the name from 
CARHCO to Walmart Central America. In January 2010 Walmart Mexico with 1410 stores 
and sales of US$22 billion dollars announced its merger with Walmart Central America 
paying US$2.7 billion dollars and acquiring a total of 519 stores, in different formats, but all 
of which were market leaders in their socio-economic segment; 11 distribution centers; 
agribusiness operations that provided its stores with perishable goods; and total annual sales 
of US$3.3 billion. See Table 8. 
TABLE 8 HERE 
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At the end of 2010 operations in CA were promising, profits were growing faster than 
sales, sales reached 3.6 billion, production capacity grew 3.7%, the use of private labels 
increased 5.2% and market shares were 75% in Guatemala, 70% in Costa Rica and 
approximately 50% in Nicaragua and Honduras.  Walmart was not present in Panama yet. 
See Table 9. Scot Rank, President and CEO of Walmart Mexico and CA, together with his 
team, made an effort to align synergies between operations in Mexico and CA in order to 
function as just one company. The company’s 2011 strategy had to be implemented based on 
operations both in Mexico and CA. 
 
FIGURE 4 HERE 
 
In El Salvador, since its entrance in 2005, Walmart competed following the same Hi Low 
pricing strategy used by Selectos. By 2011 managers had committed to growing regional 
sales from 9.7% annually in 2010 to 12% annually in 2011 and 15% in 2012. To achieve this 
goal, they had decided to go back to the global EDLP strategy, based on headquarters’ 
operations and culture, and deploy it in all of the markets of Central America, including El 
Salvador (See Figure 4).  
Walmart’s management believed that promotions and discounts and merchandizing were 
no longer necessary when using EDLP. They asked suppliers to incorporate the cost of 
merchandizing as an additional discount (between 5% and 15%) to the price. According to 
the company’s 2011 expansion plan, Walmart expected to open 80 new stores equaling over 
43,000 m² in CA. 
Strategy execution in CA was a challenge. First, they had to change the way they grew, the 
redefinition of space was essential the bet was on larger retail spaces. Alberto Ebrard, 
Executive Vice-president and COO for CA mentioned: “The first strategic change to prepare 
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the region for accelerated growth will be the redefinition of a multi-format strategy. The first 
thing was to redefine the correct customer that each store targeted and redirect business 
strategies based on those customers. For example, even though the Maxi Bodega format is a 
warehouse, it had much higher prices than discount store formats. We are re-launching the 
Bodega, lowering prices, improving selection and changing the name to Maxi Palí or Maxi 
Despensa to put it under our umbrella of discount stores” (Walmart, 2011).  See Table 9. 
 
TABLE 9 HERE 
 
In addition, Walmart’s brand will be incorporated, starting by changing the names of the 
hypermarkets to Walmart Supercenters. According to Scot Rank and Alberto Edbrard, 
aligning the regional strategy based on store type, rather than using the previous structure that 
had been to aligned by country, allowed them to focus on the specific needs of the customers 
targeted by each type of store, while permitting operational efficiencies and reduced expenses 
in order to offer EDLP. 
 
SUCAP 
 
Walmart reached US$3 billion dollars in sales for 2008. Its management and investment 
capacity terrorized domestic chains who fought to retain a portion of the Central American 
market, which included more than 35 million customers. That same year, the 
owners/founders/CEOs of the leading domestic supermarket chains in Central America 
responded by forming a strategic alliance called SUCAP - Supermercados de Central 
America y Panamá. It includes nine companies, owning 16 supermarket chains. In 2008 
SUCAP owned 278 supermarkets in six countries with US$2.2 billion in annual sales and 
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close to 24,000 employees (See Exhibit 1). The alliance started as a broad agreement to 
cooperate to face competition from foreign retailers. It gradually evolved acquiring a 
structured organizational form, and a Board of Directors led by President Francisco Calleja of 
Selectos. The first step was sharing information and ideas about what could be done. 
Secondly, the retailers began sharing best practices in the areas of logistics, operations and 
information systems, which they deem essential for their competitiveness (Retana, 2008). 
Thirdly, they began deploying a joint purchases strategy. Unlike multinational firms, local 
retailers purchase products for a limited number of stores, and thus have lower bargaining 
power with suppliers. Through join purchases the members of SUCAP can achieve better 
economies of scale, matching, at least at the regional level, the strategy of Walmart. Another 
related strategy of SUCAP is to support a small group of domestic suppliers with high 
capabilities providing them with long term contracts at a regional as opposed to national 
level, and helping them improve their products and fine tune their offerings to each specific 
market through advisory services. SUCAP is thus working as a mechanisms to pursue joint 
strategies that allow each member to reach a higher scale. Through SUCAP Selectos and the 
other domestic retailers are sharing their knowledge of their respective markets so that it 
becomes shared regional knowledge. SUCAP members are adjusting their strategies to 
exploit at best regional knowledge and additional economies of scale to face larger, and more 
resourceful multinational competitors. By 2011 SUCAP membership has not changed 
dramatically but has grown in terms of the number of supermarkets.  
 
 
TABLE 10 HERE 
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1. Closing 
Super Selectos’ management team was evaluating what strategy to follow in order to 
continue as El Salvador’s number one supermarket chain. In the last few months their 
promotional war with Walmart had been the strongest yet. “They’re killing us,” said Carlos 
Calleja. However, now Walmart decided to go for EDLP. Carlos and the Executive 
Committee were asking themselves what should be the next steps in this never ending war.  
 
Table 1.Economic context 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 2011 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.Value of Global Food Retail Industry, Period 2005-2009. 
 
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Global Food Retail Report, Datamonitor, 
2010. 
 
 
 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
3.9% 0.4% 0.4% 2.1% 6.0% 4.7% 5.7% 5.8% 4.2% -1.5% 6.1% 4.6% 
             
Central America 2.2% 1.4% 2.9% 5.7% 4.4% 5.6% 8.1% 7.6% 3.0% -1.0% 4.4% 4.3% 
             
Costa Rica 1.8% 1.1% 2.9% 6.4% 4.3% 5.9% 8.8% 7.9% 2.7% -1.0% 4.7% 4.2% 
El Salvador 2.2% 1.7% 2.3% 2.3% 1.9% 3.6% 3.9% 3.8% 1.3% -3.1% 1.4% 2.0% 
Guatemala 2.5% 2.4% 3.9% 2.5% 3.2% 3.3% 5.4% 6.3% 3.3% 0.5% 2.9% 4.1% 
Honduras 5.7% 2.7% 3.8% 4.5% 6.2% 6.1% 6.6% 6.2% 4.2% -2.4% 3.7% 3.7% 
Nicaragua 4.1% 3.0% 0.8% 2.5% 5.3% 4.3% 4.2% 5.0% 4.0% -2.2% 3.6% 5.4% 
Panamá 2.7% 0.6% 2.2% 4.2% 7.5% 7.2% 8.5% 12.1% 10.1% 3.9% 7.5% 10.8% 
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Table 2.Costs Associated with Purchasing vs. Retail Services 
Costs Associated with Purchasing Retail Services 
Time spent buying; 
Variety of products to reduce consumer’s time 
spent buying; 
Distance between consumer and store; 
 
Accessibility to locale, decreasing the distance 
between consumer and store; 
 
Change that the consumer has to make if he 
or she cannot find the exact brand and size of 
what he or she is looking for;  
 
 Ambience at locale to lower psychological 
costs of purchasing; 
Information costs in terms of products to be 
purchased; 
Availability of information and probability of 
getting the desired product at the right time, 
which lowers costs of change that consumers 
have to make if they cannot find the exact 
brand and size they want. 
Storage of bought products;  
Psychological costs of buying, issues with 
noise, cleanliness, etc. 
 
     Source: Lira (2005).  
 
 
Table 3.Income Segments in El Salvador 
Segments # Municipalities 
Poverty 
Rate 
Average Household 
Income 
Low market income 100 40.20% US$201 
Moderate-income 146 19.40% US$308 
High-income 16 7.60% US$534 
           Source: El Salvador’s Consumer Protection Agency 
 
 
 
Table 4.Classification of Market Segment by Income 
Category Income US$ 
A Greater than or equal to 3500  
B 2500 to 3499 
C+ 1500 to 2499 
C 1000 to 1499 
C- 600 to 999 
D 250 to 599 
           Source: Grupo Calleja 
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Table 5.Types of Super Selectos 
Type Logo Observations 
Super  Selectos  
Complete selection, personalized service, 
serves urban areas with middle to high 
purchasing power, open 14 hours.  
69 stores 
National 
81% of sales in 2010 
Super Selectos 
Limited selection, personalized service, 
experience, serves smaller populations with 
low to middle consumption, open 12 hours, on 
average 
 
 
15 stores 
19% of sales in 2010 
Source: Grupo Calleja, Commercial Presentation, 2011. 
 
 
Table 6.Annual Sales of Super Selectos 
Year Net Sales  (millions US$) 
2006 403 
2007 440 
2008 446 
2009 514 
2010 551 
                        Source: Grupo Calleja  
 
 
Table 7.Purchase Price to Acquire Walmart Central America 
Type of Payment Thousands of  US$ 
Stock payments 2,146,643.78 
Cash payments 110,835.81 
Contingent liability  439,671.07 
Total Purchase Price 2,697,150.66 
                       Source: Walmart Mexico (2011) 
 
 
Table 8.Financial Statements of Walmart Mexico and Central America 
  Mexico Central America Consolidated 
  2010 2009 % var. 2010 2009 % var. 2010 2009 % var. 
Net Sales  (millions of US$) 23,458.3 21,380.7 9.7 3,648.9 3,414.8 6.9 26,548.5 21,380.7 24.2 
%
 o
f 
in
co
m
e 
Gross margin 22.0 21.7 11.6 22.2 22.1 7.4 22.1 21.7 26.4 
General expenses 13.5 13.4 9.9 17.4 17.3 7.5 14.0 13.4 29.4 
Profit 8.6 8.2 14.3 4.8 4.8 7.2 8.1 8.2 21.4 
Operational cash flow 
(EBITDA) 10.4 10.0 14.2 6.5 6.5 7.5 9.9 10.0 23.0 
 Source: Walmart México (2010)  “Información Anual Financiera”  
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Figure 2A.Promotions from Super Selectos and Selectos Market 
 
 
 
Figure 2B.Promotions from Super Selectos and Selectos Market 
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Figure 3.Organizational structure 
 
Figure 
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Figure 4. Walmart Everyday Low Prices 
 
 
Table 9. Types of Stores Walmart Mexico and Central America 
Type Logo Observations 
Warehouses and Discount 
Stores 
Inexpensive stores that offer 
basic merchandise, food and 
household goods. Value 
proposal: price 
 
 
1,718 stores  
457 cities  
38.6 % of sales in 2010 
 
Hypermarkets 
Hypermarkets that offer 
wider selection of 
merchandise, from groceries 
and perishable items to 
clothing and general 
merchandise. Value proposal: 
price and selection 
 
 
 
 
 
230 stores  
84 cities 
27.0 % of sales in 2010 
Price Club 
Wholesale price clubs with 
membership, focused on 
businesses and consumers 
who buy the best price. Value 
proposal: price leader, 
volume, new and different 
merchandise 
 
 
 
128 stores  
75 cities  
22.7 % of sales in 2010 
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Supermarkets 
Supermarkets located in 
residential areas. Value 
proposal: quality, 
convenience and service 
 
 
184 stores 
44 cities  
7.0 % of sales in 2010 
Department 
Clothing stores that offer the 
best fashion for the whole 
family at the best price. Value 
proposal: fashion with value, 
price and quality 
 
 
 
94 stores  
34 cities  
3.0 % of sales in 2010 
Restaurants 
Restaurant chain, leader in 
cafeteria-restaurant industry. 
Includes Mexican food with 
El Portón restaurants. Value 
proposal: convenience, flavor 
and quality 
 
 
 
 
 
365 stores 
65 cities  
1.7 % of sales in 2010 
Bank 
Commercial bank for clients 
of Walmart Mexico stores, 
basic products and financial 
services. Value proposal: 
convenience, simple and price 
 
 
 
 
 
263 stores  
31 cities  
910,000 account holders in 
Mexico 
 Source: Walmart Mexico and Central America  
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Table 10 . SUCAP membership by country in 2011 and number of stores 
Country Name of supermarket chain Number of stores  
 
 
Costa Rica 
 
Turribasicos 
Peri 
Auto Mercado 
Jumbo 
Super Compro 
 
 
3 
19 
14 
6 
32 
 
El Salvador 
Super Selectos 
Selectos Market 
Dollar Market 
 
68 
16 
2 
Guatemala La Torre 
Econo Super 
 
27 
18 
   
Honduras La Colonia 
 
20 
Nicaragua La Colonia 
 
16 
Panama Mega Depot 
El Machetazo 
Super 99 
2 
12 
34 
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from SUMMA (2012) 
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Exhibit 1 
 Hypermarkets and Supermarkets in Central America by 2011 
In Guatemala Walmart had seven hypermarkets, 166 supermarkets under different names and 
two membership clubs stores. The second chain was Unisuper, with 44 supermarkets and one 
discount warehouse. PriceSmart had three stores. There were also over 70 convenience stores 
that were mostly located at gas stations. 
In Honduras, Walmart had seven hypermarkets and 49 supermarkets under different names. 
The next largest retailer was La Colonia supermarket with 17 stores. PriceSmart had two stores. 
Also, there were different local competitors in each Department and there were around 400 
convenience stores, mostly located at gas stations. 
In Nicaragua Walmart owned seven supermarkets under La Unión brand focused in the high 
and middle-high income segments and 53 supermarkets under Palí brand for lower and middle 
income segments. La Colonia owned by the Mantica family, which was not related to the 
Honduran chain, had 15 supermarkets and, discount warehouses and one hypermarket. 
PriceSmart had one store, and there were many convenience stores operated in the country. 
Costa Rica had 333 supermarkets in 2010. Walmart had 180 stores including supermarkets 
and hypermarkets under the names Mas x Menos, Maxi Bodega, Palí and Hipermas. Corporacion 
Megasuper owned 82 stores and Grupo Gessa 59 the latter had several brands and had acquired 
small locales or chains in rural parts of the country since 2004 as part of its expansion strategy. 
Automercado competed with 12 stores focused on the middle to upper segments and PriceSmart 
had five stores. AM-PM supermarkets had 20 stores and nine convenience stores. Finally, there 
were also convenience stores located at gas stations. 
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In Panama, Super 99 had 33 stores owned by the Martinelli family. Grupo Rey owned the 
second largest chain and had a total of 18 supermarkets by 2010. PriceSmart had four stores. 
Convenience stores were opened at Esso gas stations currently 17, but planned to open more 
stores in their 45 gas stations. Shell had a total of nine stores under the name Select and Texaco 
had 15 years of experience managing the StarMart convenience stores. 
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